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INTRODUCTION

Our world has evolved.
Modem society is largely dependent on
technology, wireless devices, and the never-ending appetite for scientific
development. Legal discovery is no longer limited to hard-copy, tangible
documents.' Property interests are no longer exclusive to personal and real
property.2 The First Amendment no longer limits its protection to solely
written or spoken words.' Our world has evolved, and the law has adjusted
accordingly.
What remains constant is the yearning for truth. The clash of technology
and the law is an exciting, yet dangerous phenomena. It is dangerous
because society needs a justice system that seeks truth, yet desperately needs
technological progress. What results when our thirst for truth conflicts with
the scientific changes for which we so franticly ask? The answer has typically
been adjustment.'
1. See, e.g., Brandon M. Kimura & Eric K. Yamamoto, Electronic Discovery: A Callfora New Rules
Regimefor the Hawai'i Courts, 32 U. HAw. L. REV. 153, 155 (2009) (presenting the arrival of electronic
discovery as a "technology revolution" transforming modem discovery).
2. Cf Bd. of Trs. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776, 785 (2011) (recognizing the notion
that "[a]lthough much [of] intellectual property law has changed in the 220 years since the first Patent
Act," the premise that "inventors have [a] right to patent their inventions has not").
3. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 397 (1989) (finding the burning of the American flag
to be "expressive conduct within protection of [the] First Amendment").
4. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001) (rejecting a "mechanical interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment" in the face of "advancing technology"); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498,
537 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting) (recognizing a "slippery slope ... would result from a
wooden application of the third-party doctrine[,]" and further identifying such as an explanation for
the insistence of the Supreme Court "that technological change sometimes requires us to consider the
scope of decades-old Fourth Amendment rules" (citing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35)); cf Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) ("To read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the
public telephone has come to play in private communication."). Another example is the case Riley v.
Cakfornia, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). There, the Court was asked to decide whether the decades-old
"search-incident-to-arrest" exception to the warrant requirement applied to cell phones on an arrestee's
person. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2481 (2014) ("Mhe Fourth Amendment permits a
warrantless search of cell phone data incident to an arrest, so long as the cell phone was immediately
associated with the arrestee's person." (citing California v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 505-06 (2011)); see also
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The Fourth Amendment's protection is largely governed by the
reasonable expectation of privacy.' Therefore, the Fourth Amendment
demands adjustment; a reasonable expectation of privacy, without adjustment
to modern trends, is not reasonable at all.' Indeed, "we must never forget
that it is a constitution we are expounding."' As the late Justice Scalia noted,
"[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to
citizens by the Fourth Amendment [would be] entirely unaffected by the
advance of technology." 8
Accordingly, this Comment aims to signal a need for an adjustment in the
Fourth Amendment's third-party doctrine, while also analyzing government
hacking in relation to the Fourth Amendment. Section I will provide an
overview of government hacking. Section II will provide a brief history of
the Fourth Amendment. Section III will discuss software used to conceal
an IP address and Fourth Amendment implications. Section IV will analyze
the Western District of Texas's approach to IP address concealing software.
Section V will examine the third-party doctrine. Section VI will demonstrate
the need for Supreme Court guidance on the third-party doctrine in a digital
age. Section VI will also propose a small framework for courts to follow
until the Supreme Court re-visits the third-party doctrine. The Comment
concludes with final thoughts in Section VII.
This Comment will not examine Rule 41(b)' and its forthcoming
amendment. 1 0 The proposed amendment is limited in scope and will not

id. at 2495-96 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement) (discussing the origins of
the search-incident-to-arrest rule and how it relates to cell phones and personal privacy with modern
technology). California argued the Court's decade-old law controlled the decision. See id. at 2485
(majority opinion) (suggesting, without deciding, "that a search of cell phone data might help ensure
officer safety" but the parties failed to "suggest that their concerns [were] based on actual experience").
But the Riley Court reasoned that cell "phones are based on technology nearly inconceivable just a few
decades ago, when [the law was] decided." Id. at 2484. Accordingly, Fourth Amendment analysis has
typically adjusted as technology advances over time.
5. See KaI5, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[A] person has a constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy[.]").
6. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment andNew Technologies: ConstitutionalMyths andthe Casefor
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 805 (2004) (arguing the Fourth Amendment requires consistent
monitoring of technology's effects on privacy).

7.

See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (explaining how the text of the

Constitution does not include every possible interpretation as, for example, a statute would).

8.

Kylo, 533 U.S. at 33-34.

9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) (discussing search and seizure procedure).
10. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CRIMINAL RULES 67-71 (2016) (proposing an amendment to Rule 41(b)).
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address constitutional questions. 1 Constitutional standards will be left to
"ongoing case law development." 1 2 Instead, this Comment will analyze the
Fourth Amendment as it applies to government hacking, a user's
expectation of privacy while browsing with concealing software, the varying
rationales of the courts, and the need for adjustment in the third-party
doctrine.
II.

GOVERNMENT

HACKING-NETWORK

INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUES

The clash between scientific advancement and the search for truth has
recently taken an interesting form-government hacking. The United States
Government has increasingly used Network Investigation Techniques
A NIT is a hacking
(NITs) to target suspects mi criminal investigations.1
their identity with
shielding
suspects
method used to identify criminal
4
anonymous servers." To put things into perspective, imagine a criminal
suspect browsing the Internet. The suspect utilizes software, which
conceals his or her Internet Protocol Address (P address), and browses the
Internet anonymously. Later, the FBI uses a NIT to decipher the suspect's
concealed IP address. The FBI intends to use the decoded IP throughout
their investigation. Must they have obtained a warrant before obtaining the
IP address?
Essentially, this is how NITs operate-they identify criminal suspects
who have taken affirmative steps to conceal their identity while browsing
11. See id. at 69 (explaining the revision of Rule 41(b) makes clear that the rule "identifies courts
that may consider an application for a warrant, not the constitutional requirements for the issuance of
a warrant, which must still be met").
12. Id at 71.
13. See United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2016) ("A number of
federal courts have recently issued opinions in cases arising from [a] NIT application[.]"); see also United
States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 592 (E.D. Va. 2016) ("Defendant seeks to suppress 'all evidence
seized from Mr. Matish's home computer by the FBI ... through the use of a network investigative
technique . . . ."); United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26,26 (D. Mass. 2016) (addressing the use of
the NIT in a child pornography case, which traced an IP address to the suspect's home); United States
v. Epich, No. 15-CR-163-PP, 2016 WL 953269, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 14, 2016) (denying a motion to
suppress evidence gathered by a NIT); United States v. Stamper, No. 1:15cr109, 2016 WL 695660,
at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2016) (explaining the scope of the Fourth Amendment as it relates to
government hacking); United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *3 (W.D.
Wash Jan. 28, 2016) (addressing how the FBI utilized a NIT to collect an "IP address, MAC address,
and other computer-identifying information").
14. See Kevin Poulsen, Documents: FBI Spyware Has Been Snating Extortionists, Hackersfor Years,
PM),
http://www.wired.com/2009/04/fbi-spyware-pro/
WIRED
(April 16,
2009,
9:33
[https://perma.cc/8Z2S-7857] ("The software's primary utility appears to be in tracking down
suspects that use proxy servers or anonymizing websites to cover their tracks.").
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the Internet. The hacking technique has become especially useful to
government officials attempting to capture criminal suspects utilizing the
"dark web."" Unclear, however, is whether a NIT falls within the scope
of a Fourth Amendment search when deployed against a user intentionally
shielding his or her IP address. 1 6

III.
A.

A BRIEF OVERVIEW

OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The Propert Approach

The Fourth Amendment commands "the people be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures[.]"" On its face, the Fourth Amendment protects two types of
expectations: one involving searches, the other involving seizures.1 " This
Comment focuses on searches.
The Fourth Amendment has endured intense scrutiny, which has often

15. See David Glance, Explainer What is the Dark Web?, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 13, 2015,
[https://perma.cc/
1:28 AM), http://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-the-dark-web-46070
4VM8-M9SK] ("The 'dark web'is a part of the world wide web that requires special software to access.
Once inside, websites and other services can be accessed through a browser in much the same way as
the normal web."). Because the dark web affords anonymity, it is a common "choice for groups
wanting to stay hidden online from governments and law enforcement agencies . . . [and is frequently]
used by paedophile groups, terrorists and criminals to keep their dealings secret." Id.
16. See Adam Shepherd, FBI Needs a Warrantto Hack Your Computer, judge Rules, IT PRO (Sep 12,
2016),
http://www.itpro.co.uk/security/27222/fbi-needs-a-warrant-to-hack-your-computer-judgerules [https://perma.cc/V5VS-E776 ] ("Legal opinion on this topic has been divided, however, and as
part of a case relating to the same FBI operation, a Virginia District Judge ruled that the government
needed no warrant in order to hack a defendant's computer."). If no warrant is needed, it follows that
government hacking is not a search. See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 527-28 (E.D.
Va. 2016) ("If the use of the NIT was not a search, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated, [and]
no warrant was required[.]"). On the other hand, if a NIT is a search, the Fourth Amendment would
require a warrant.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Laura Wagner, Federal judge Rules FBI
Can't Hack Someone's Computer Without Warrant, SLATE
(Sept. 12, 2016, 5:13 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/futuretense/2016/09/12/federaljudgerulesfbican-t-hacksome
one_s_computer withoutwarrant.html [https://perma.cc/2F9J-PZNR] (recognizing the argument
that government hacking "doesn't constitute a 'search,' and therefore doesn't require a warrant at all");
Janus Kopfstein, Federal judge: Hacking Someone's Computer is Defnitey a 'Search', MOTHERBOARD
(Sept. 11, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/hacking-is-a-search-according-tofederal-judge (pointing to court splits on the issue); Ali Breland,Judge Rules a Poce Hack Can be a Search,

THE HILL (Sept. 12, 2016, 10:52 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/295406-judge-rules-apolice-hack-can-be-a-search [https://perma.cc/Z4PG-TUTY9] (recognizing a judge's ruling that
government hacking was "unquestionably a 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes").
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18.

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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resulted in adjustment, restriction, or expansion of its purview.1 9 Early
"Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common law trespass ...
until the latter half of the 20th century." 2 0 A shining example is the case
Olmstead v. United States,2 1 where then Chief Justice Taft reasoned a wiretap
was not a search because it did not violate Olmstead's property rights.
Under Olmstead, a NIT would not be considered a search because NIT
applications are free of intrusion on a person's physical property.
Ironically, Olmstead also stands for the demise of the property approach.
As one commentator notes, the Supreme Court rejected the "propertybased view" in part because of Justice Brandeis's dissent.2 ' Brandeis
explained that although the Constitution is enacted from an "experience of
evils," a Fourth Amendment interpretation should not be restricted to the
form such evils have taken, because as time passes, evil takes new forms. 25
The dissent expressed a need for a flexible interpretation of the amendment;
a provision affording individual protection against a specific abuse of power
could not be limited to the society surrounding the hands that drafted it.2 6
If the Fourth Amendment is to offer any protection at all, it must be capable
of adjustment. 27 Rightfully, Olmsteadis no longer the law.2 8

19.

See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (explaining the evolution of Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence regarding trespass law); see also Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010)
(describing how "[t]he Court must proceed with care when considering ... privacy expectations in
communications" because of a possible risk of error due to "emerging technology" in society).

20. Jones, 565 U.S. at 405 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)).
21.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States,

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
22. See id. at 466 (reasoning wiretapping was not a "search or seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment" as there was no physical entry).
23. See id. (holding precedent, at that time, required there be "an official search and seizure" of
a person's tangible material, "or an actual physical invasion of his house").
24. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: ConstitutionalMyths andthe Case
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 817 (2004) (recognizing existing scholarship supporting the notion
that the Supreme Court rejected Olmsteads property-based approach in echo of Justice Brandeis's
dissent).
25. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Time ... brings into existence
new conditions and purposes.").
26. See id. at 472 ("Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of
power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing world.").
27. See id. at 473 ("[A] principal to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief

which gave it birth.").
28. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 191 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (declaring Olmstead "is no longer the law"); see also Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.

244, 278 (1969) (Fortas,J., dissenting) ("Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in [Olmsteadj
that surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell outside the
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The ReasonableExpectation of Privacy

Rejecting Olmstead's approach, KatZ v. United States` revolutionized
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when Justice Harlan declared the Fourth
Amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy.3 0
In Katzq
Justice Harlan set forth a two-pronged test for determining whether a
person holds the requisite expectation under the Fourth Amendment: first,
a person must exhibit "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy[;]" 3 1
and second, the expectation must "be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable."' 3 2 Despite a ground-breaking framework, society
continues to advance, catapulting complex issues into courts across the
country. Applying the law to rapid advancenfents in technology is not as
straight-forward as it may have once been.
IV.

THE ONION ROUTER AND THE

ANoNYMous IP

ADDRESS

As previously mentioned, a NIT is especially helpful in attempting to
capture criminal suspects utilizing the dark web.
Accessing the dark web
requires software which conceals a user's IP address.3
It is helpful to
understand how an IP address works before discussing Fourth Amendment
implications.

A.

The IP Address

An internet protocol address (IP address) "is a unique identifying number
3
given to every single computer on the Internet." s This identifying number
ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision
rested."); see also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960) (articulating why "it is unnecessary
and ill-advised" to have Olmstead as the law, when the law has been "developed and refined by the
common law"), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). But see Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511, 531 (1985) (citation omitted) ("[A]lthough the rule in Olmsteadhad suffered some erosion,
the Court had never explicidy disavowed it." (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961))).
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
30. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 361.
32. Id. But see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 409 (2012) ("Mhe Katq reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substitutedfor, the common-law trespassory test.").
33. See Glance, supranote 15 (discussing the concept of the "dark web," where certain websites
are hidden, and thus become a common choice for pedophile, terrorist, and criminal groups seeking
to evade law enforcement agencies).

34.

See United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 437 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (expounding on the

deployment of a NIT used to combat a suspect accessing the dark web); see also Glance, supra note 15
(explaining the need for special software to access the dark web).
35. Paul Gil, IP Addresses, Explained: How IP Addresses Work on the Web, LIFEWIRE,
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is akin to a license plate on a car-"it shows ownership, allows the machine
to be located by other machines, and empowers authorities to track and
protect people's safety, if need be." 6 Typically, when a user attempts to
visit a webpage, a request is sent out to that webpage, and the information
sought is sent back to the user's IP address.3 7
In effect, the Internet is a hierarchy of networks simultaneously
distributing identification information.3 8 When a user types a URL into a
web browser, the browser contacts a specific server in order to obtain the
user's IP address." That specific server then sends a "query" to the URL's
server, inquiring into whether the URL server knows the IP address for the
website the user is trying to visit.40 If the server for the URL knows the IP
address for the target website, it returns the website's IP address to the URL
server.4 1 Finally, the URL server returns the website's IP address to the
user's browser and the webpage appears. 4 2 This process is repeated each
time a user visits a webpage.
Therefore, a user wishing to cloak their online identity must bypass the
complicated web of global networks and abstract procedures described
above. 4 4 One way of achieving this is through software like "TOR"-an
acronym for "The Onion Router." 4 s

https://www.ifewire.com/how-ip-addresses-work-on-he-web-2483446

[https://perma.cc/Z4PG-

TUY9)].'
36. Id
37.

See IP 101: The Basics of IP Addresses, WHATIsMYIPADDRESS.COM, [hereinafter IP 101],

http://whatismyipaddress.com/ip-basics [https://perma.cc/N96M-RTVF] (declaring an IP address
holds "a significant role" between a computer and the internet).
38. See Jeff Tyson, How Internet Infrastructure Works, HoWSTUFFWoRKS
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/basics/internet-infrastructurel.htm

(Apr. 3, 2001),

[https://perma.cc/4KCY-5GUY] (characterizing the internet as "simply a network of networks'.
39. See id. (describing the interaction between a browser and an IP address).
40.
41.

See id (providing an example of a query in conjunction with a visit to a website).
See id. (detailing the process once an IP address has been identified by a server).
42. See id. (concluding the process governing the interplay of browser, server, and IP address).
43. See IP 101, supra note 37 ("When you go online for email, to shop or chat, your request has
to be sent out to the right destination, and the responses and information you want need to come back
directly to you. An IP address plays a significant role in that").
44. See Tyson, supra note 38 (describing the Internet as a "global collection of networks, both

big and small").
45. See Glance, supra note 15 ("There are a number of ways to access the dark web, including
the use of Tor . . one of the easiest software packages to use."); see also United States v. Broy, 209 F.

Supp. 3d 1045, 1049 (C.D. Ill. 2016) (explaining how TOR works to "mask a user's IP address").
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The Onion Router

TOR allows users to "view, upload and share [information] without being
identified by traditional law enforcement investigative methods.""6 When

someone uses software like TOR, the software masks the user's IP address
with the help of volunteers around the world:
When first logging into the Tor network, a user, whether knowingly or not,
communicates his or her IP address to the first node volunteer. It is only after
an IP address has been routed through multiple nodes that a user's IP address
becomes masked. Indeed, when a user finally accesses a website while logged
into the Tor network, only the IP address of the "exit node" is visible to that
site (and to any law enforcement officials monitoring that site). Traditional
investigative techniques are therefore ineffective in finding a Tor user's real
IP address. 4 7
Stated simply, TOR routes IP addresses through a network of volunteer
computers called "nodes" to mask the original user's IP address. As a result,
it is nearly "impossible to trace the IP address back to the originating
computer."" Consequently, a user browsing with TOR holds at least a
subjective expectation of privacy,4" for the entire purpose behind TOR is
to remain anonymous.so A subjective expectation of privacy satisfies the
first prong in Justice Harlan's two-pronged test.s" What this Comment
discusses is applicable to the second prong: is society ready to accept this
expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable?"

46. United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 435 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
47. Brvy, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1049; see also Glance, supra note 15 ("Tor provides secrecy and
anonymity by passing messages through a network of connected Tor relays, which are specially
configured computers.'. The article explains how TOR sends a message, which "hops from one node
to another" while encryption ensures only the receiving node "knows about the machine that sent the
message." Id.
48. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 437. But see Glance, supra note 15 ("It is a mistake to think that
Tor is entirely anonymous. If a web site is accessed, it can still potentially find out information about
whoever is accessing the site because of information that is shared, such as usernames and email
addresses. Those wanting to stay completely anonymous have to use special anonymity services to
hide their identity in these cases.").
49. See, e.g., United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 615 (E.D. Va. 2016) (reasoning a TOR
user "hopes for, if not possesses, a subjective expectation of privacy in his or her identifying
information").
50. See id. (taking note of TOR marketing itself as a location hiding tool).
51. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (iarlan, J., concurring) (delineating the
actual, subjective expectation of privacy requirement).
52. See id. (illustrating the principle with the example of public conversations where one
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THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

Addressing a novel issue without circuit court precedent," district courts
across the country are producing split opinions.5
The issue reached the
Western District of Texas in 2016.

A.

The IP Address Is of No Import?

In United States v. Torres," the court held that locating a criminal suspect's
IP address through the use of a NIT constituted a search implicating the
Fourth Amendment.5
A website ("Website A") operated as a hidden
service under TOR to advertise and distribute child pornography."
Specifically, Website A "hosted 95,148 posts, 9,333 topics, and 158,094
members[.]"' To combat this, the FBI began to operate Website A from
a government server as part of an investigation." Eventually, the FBI
deployed a NIT, which caused Website A's users to disclose certain
information when they logged on to the website.6 o The information
included the user's "IP address .. . a unique identifier generated by the NIT

possesses no objectively reasonable expectation of not being overheard).
53. Only district courts have addressed the TOR network and its Fourth Amendment
implications.
54. See Kopfstein, supra at note 16 ("Courts across the country can't seem to agree on whether
the FBI's recent hacking activities ran afoul of the law .... Some [courts] argu[e] that hacking doesn't
constitute a 'search,' and therefore doesn't require a warrant at all."); see also C. Aliens,Judge:FBIPlaypen
Hack Is "Unquestionably" a Search Under Fourth Amendment, DEEPDOTWEB (Sept. 25, 2016),
https://www.deepdotweb.com/2016/09/25/judge-fbi-playpen-hack-unquestionably-search-fourthammendment/ [https://perma.cc/6QNY-7ZTB] ("[U]ntil now, no judge has ruled that law
enforcement hacking is considered a search under the Fourth Amendment. Previous judges made their
decision based on the defendant's lack of 'reasonable expectation of privacy."); Joseph
Remines, 'Hacking Someone's Computer is Definitely a Search", THE MERKLE (Sept. 11,
2016), http://themerkle.com/hacking-someones-computer-is-definitely-a-search/ [https://perma.cc/
G8UJ-MCKE] (writing about how "[a] federal judge in Texas ruled that sending malware to someone's
computer without their prior knowledge is classified as a search under the [Fourth] Amendment" but
that a Virginia judge ruled "a warrant wasn't even needed for government hacking purposes"); see also
Greg Masters, FBI Sweep: It's a Search, Get a Warrant, Says Fed Judge, SC MAGAZINE (Sept. 14, 2016),
https://www.scmagazine.com/fbi-sweep-its-a-search-get-a-warrant-says-fed-judge/article/529536/
[https://perma.cc/SV94-S2BT] ( "The legality of FBI investigations using a NIT warrant has
previously been questioned with courts in different jurisdictions issuing conflicting rulings.").
55. United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9,
2016).
56. See id at *3 ("This was unquestionably a 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes.").
57. Id. at *1 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9,2016).
58. Id.
59. Id at *2.
60. Id
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to distinguish ... users from one another, and the operating system of the
[user's] computer.""1 As a result, when Torres logged onto Website A, the
NIT was triggered and released Torres's IP address to investigators. 62 At
that point, the FBI linked the disclosed IP address to a certain Internet
service provider and subpoenaed that provider.6 3 In turn, the subpoenaed
information led investigators to Torres, and he was arrested. 64 Despite the
intricate use of the IP address and the extensive process used to identify its
owner, the court reasoned an IP address did not afford a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and was, therefore, irrelevant to the analysis.6 5
Instead, the court swiftly focused its attention on the expectation of
privacy in Torres's computer.66 Concluding it was of "no import" that Torres
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address, 6 7 the court
proceeded to compare Torres's computer to a cellphone.6 8 The argument
was that just as a user holds a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
cellphone, a user also holds the same expectation in their computer. 6 9 The
holding required the government to obtain a warrant before issuing the
NIT.7 o
Although the court's reasoning is thorough, its analysis is open to
criticism. For example, it is true the Fourth Amendment may protect
content stored on a cellphone-the protection stems from the word

61.
62.

Id.
Id.

63.

See id. (issuing a subpoena for records from Time Warner Cable, which lead to the discovery

of Mr. Torres's IP address).

64.
65.

Id.
Id. at *3.

66. See id. (emphasizing Torres's "expectation of privacy in his IP address [was] of no import").
67. The court noted that one holds no reasonable expectation of privacy in their IP address,
even while using TOR. See id. ("[qourts-both those to address the issue in the context of the NIT
warrant and those addressing the issue in the context of IP addresses more generally, have consistently
found that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address itself, even when using a Tor

browser." (citing United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 528-29 (E.D. Va. 2016))). This led to
the court's determination that Torres's IP address was of "no import" to the analysis. Id.
68. See id. (applying the Supreme Court's reasoning that "due to the extensive amount of
personal information contained" within both a cell phone and a computer, a similar expectation of

privacy should apply).
69. See id. (positing the idea that because the Supreme Court has held "individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phones," the same logic applies to computers (citing

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014))).
70. See id. (adopting the conclusion that despite any lack of expectation of privacy, the use of
the NIT by the government was a search according to the Fourth Amendment).
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"papers" within the amendment itself.7 ' The word "papers" affords
protection for "private information . . store[d] on digital devices[,]" which
may encompass a cellphone. 7 ' Typically, there is a vast amount of personal
information on cellphones, and the Supreme Court has afforded such
content a reasonable expectation of privacy.7
Nonetheless, the Torres court's analysis is devoid of case law withholding
Fourth Amendment protection from non-content information.7 ' The
Supreme Court has distinguished content from non-content information.75
71. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494-95 (explaining "cell phones are not just another technological
convenience" because they contain "the privacies of life" (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886))). The Court explains that just because "technology now allows an individual to carry such
information in his hand does not [mean] the information [is] any less worthy of the protection for
which the Founders fought." Id. at 2495. The Court further made clear that police officers must obtain
a warrant before searching cell phones incident to arrest. See id. ("Our answer to the question of what
police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple-get a
warrant."); see also United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013) (stressing the importance
of either a warrant or particularized suspicion to examine, in depth, the contents of a computer at the
border). In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit credited our Founders for incorporating "papers" within the
Fourth Amendment, which was interpreted to include "papers we create and maintain not only in

physical but also in digital form[.]" Id at 957.
72. See Coteman, 709 F.3d at 964 (indicating electronic devices satisfy Justice Harlan's twoprong test, because such devices simultaneously serve as "offices and personal diaries"); see also United
States v. Turner, 839 F.3d 429, 435-36 (5th Cir. 2016) (analyzing the reasonable expectation of privacy
in a gift card by comparing them to cell phones, noting "[a] primary purpose of modern cell phones,
and certainly of computers, is to store personal information").
73. See, e.g., Rilyj, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (reasoning that because cell phones "place vast quantities of
personal information literally in the hands of individuals[,]" the Fourth Amendment demands a warrant
before an officer conducts a search).

74. Accord United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor,

J.,

concurring)

(recognizing the Fourth Amendment does not protect "phone numbers" disclosed to phone
companies and "e-mail addresses" disclosed to service providers, because the information is noncontent); see ExparteJackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (distinguishing between a search of the "outward
form" of mail, which does not require warrant, versus a search of the contents within, which does); see

also United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 433 (4th Cir. 2016) ("What Defendants fail to recognize is
that for each medium of communication these cases address, there is also a case expressly withholding
Fourth Amendment protection from non-content information, i.e., information involving addresses

and routing." (citing Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733)); see alo United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 887
(6th Cir. 2016) (referring to the modem-day letter-the email-as holding similar protections under
the Fourth Amendment, while simultaneously accepting the lack of any reasonable expectation of
privacy in non-content information, such as an IP address (citing United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d

266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010))).
75. Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (emphasis added) (holding that
"[t]he Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words" was a

search under the Fourth Amendment), with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding
the police's installation of a pen register-a device that tracked the phone numbers a person dialswas not a search.). The Court, in Smithb, explained: "Although [the caller's] conduct may have been

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss1/3

12

Mendoza: Network Investigation Techniques

COMMENT

2017]

249

Content information enjoys Fourth Amendment protection, while noncontent information does not.7 6

Therefore, although a cellphone and a

computer may be similar, the similarity is nullified for Fourth Amendment
purposes if the information obtained is non-content.7 7 In light of this
distinction, a critic might argue the court should have inquired into whether
the information obtained through the NIT was "content information"
before concluding that all information on a user's computer is "content"
just because of the similarities between computers and cellphones.
B.

Content v. Non-Content

Let us revisit the facts in Torres the information obtained through the
NIT was Torres's IP address, a unique identifier and the operating system
for Torres's computer." To be clear, the NIT did not gather images or
other media.7 1 Instead, it only gathered identifying information, such as
Torres's IP address.8 o The court nonetheless reasoned a violation occurred
because Torres had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the "content" of
his computer." Because the NIT only gathered identifying information like

calculated to keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and could not have been
calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he dialed." Smith, 442 U.S. at 743; see also Graham,
824 F.3d at 433 (tracing the history of the Supreme Court's distinction between content and noncontent information in communications). In Graham, the Fourth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the
Sixth Circuit, recognizing that CSLI is non-content information because "cell-site data-like mailing
addresses, phone numbers, and IP addresses-are information that facilitate personal communications,
rather than part of the content of those communications themselves." Id. (quoting Carpenter, 819 F.3d

at 887-88).
76. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 433 ("The Supreme Court has thus forged a clear distinction
between the contents of communications and the non-content information that enables
communications providers to transmit the content."); see also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (deciding the vast
amount of information contained within a cellphone demands a warrant be required before a search is
conducted); see also Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (clarifying the distinction between a search of the outward
appearance and weight of an envelope versus an inward search of the contents contained therein).
77. See Graham, 824 F.3d at 433 (explaining how "mailing addresses, phone numbers, and IP
addresses" are non-content information, and thereby precluded from Fourth Amendment protection).

78.

See United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, slip op. at *2

(W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016) ("[The NIT caused] the 'activating' computer to send certain information to
a computer run by the Government. This information included the IP address of the 'activating'
computer, a unique identifier generated by the NIT to distinguish 'activating' users from one another,
and the operating system of the 'activating' computer.").
79. See id. (emphasizing the purpose of the NIT was not to obtain content, but rather "to assist
the FBI in identifying the 'activating computers' and their users").
80. See id. (noting the NIT caused the computer to transmit the IP address and other identifying
information, not content based data).
81. See id. (intimating "it is reasonable to find that persons also have a reasonable expectation of

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

13

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 1, Art. 3

250

ST. MARY'S L-4WJOURNAL

[Vol. 49:237

the IP address, it follows that the court believed an IP address is "content
information," because the violation itself was based on intrusion into the
content of Torres's computer through the NIT, which only gathered
identiginginformation.8 2
But other courts have declined to extend "content" status to an IP
address or other information routinely conveyed to third parties." For
privacy in their personal computers, due to the vast amount of personal information they contain"
(citing United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cit. 2004); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403
(4th Cir. 2001); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cit. 2001))).
82. See id. ("Here, the NIT placed code on Mr. Torres' computer without his permission, causing
it to transmit his IP address and other identifying data to the government. That Mr. Torres did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address is of no import. This was unquestionably a
'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes.").
83. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (reiterating the notion that information
conveyed to a third party, even for limited purposes, is not protected under the Fourth Amendment
(citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971)); see also United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161,
164 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting a defendant's claim of a subjective expectation of privacy in his Internet
subscriber information because he "voluntarily conveyed" it to a third party); United States v. Perrine,
518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008) ("Every federal court to address this issue has held that subscriber
information provided to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment's privacy
expectation."); Guest, 255 F.3d at 336 (6th Cit. 2001) (noting "computer users do not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in their subscriber information because they have conveyed it to another
person-the system operator"); In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
5 2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114,133 (E.D. Va. 2011) ("Even if Petitioners had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in IP address information collected by Twitter, Petitioners voluntarily relinquished any
reasonable expectation of privacy under the third-party doctrine."); United States v. D'Andrea,
497 F. Supp. 2d 117, 120 (D. Mass. 2007) ("The Smith line of cases has led federal courts to uniformly
conclude that internet users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their subscriber information,
the length of their stored files, and other non-content data to which service providers must have
access." (citing Guest, 255 F.3d at 336 (6th Cir. 2001))); Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d
174, 181 (D. Conn. 2005) (indicating most courts, for Fourth Amendment purposes, have concluded
that one does not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information voluntarily
conveyed to Internet providers); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d 843, 848 (D. Md. 2005) ("The
courts that have already addressed this issue [] uniformly have found that individuals have no Fourth
Amendment privacy interest in subscriber information given to an ISP."); United States v. Cox, 190 F.
Supp. 2d 330, 332 (N.D.N.Y 2002) (recognizing individuals "have no Fourth Amendment privacy
interest in subscriber information given to an [ISP]" (citing United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d
1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000))); Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1110 (rejecting a privacy interest in subscriber
information revealed to third parties (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979))); United
States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508-09 (W.D. Va. 1999) (finding no legitimate expectation of
privacy in non-content customer information provided to an Internet service provider). The court
explained, in In reAppkcation, that to access Twitter, a user must voluntarily "disclose their IP addresses
to third parties[,]" which implicates "significant Fourth Amendment consequences under the thirdparty doctrine[.]" In re Appkration, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 133; cf United States v. Hernandez, 313 F.3d
1206, 1209-10 (9th Cit. 2002) (echoing a similar expectation of privacy in packages handled by mail
service providers-one expects the interior to remain private while the exterior is not protected under
voluntary-conveyance theory). This idea was further explained by the Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Forrester

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol49/iss1/3

14

Mendoza: Network Investigation Techniques

2017]

251

COMMENT

instance, in United States v. Hambrick," the Fourth Circuit held that while
certain circumstances warrant some "expectation of privacy in content
information, a person does not have an interest in the account information
85
given to [an] ISP [because such information] is non-content information."
Similarly, an IP address is routinely provided to Internet service providers,
making it non-content information." This has become the essence of what
is now known as the third-party doctrine, which is discussed infra."
Despite this, the court in Torres felt Torres's situation was different
because the NIT allegedly placed code onto Torres's computer without
permission." Because of that, the court reasoned placing a NIT onto
Torres's computer was the search, as compared to the information
This reasoning probably
acquisition itself constituting the search."
rendered the third-party doctrine moot. Still, one might argue this reasoning
is inconsistent with the court's description of how the NIT operated. The
NIT was deployed so "users who accessed the target website .

.

. by logging

in with a username and password, would be issued certain instructions,
causing the 'activating' computer to send certain information to a computer
Therefore, a user was given specific
run by the Government."9o
instructions and took affirmative steps which caused a computer to send
identifying information to the government. A user taking affirmative steps
to activate the NIT would seem to preclude the argument that the NIT was
placed without permission.
Furthermore, the NIT did not attach itself to Torres's computer, but

where the court articulated that an "[e]-mail, like physical mail, has an outside address 'visible' to thirdparty carriers[,]" thus destroying any reasonable expectation of privacy in the e-mail address once

conveyed to the third party. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008).
84. United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000).
85. Id. at *4 (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 741).
86. See id. (suggesting "[d]isclosure of [] non-content information to a third party destroys the
privacy expectation").
87. The third-party doctrine is more fully explained at the latter end of this Comment, at 118.
In short, the third-party doctrine, also known as voluntary-conveyance theory, holds that a reasonable
expectation of privacy is diminished when the subject information is conveyed to a third party. See,

e.g., United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment's 'thirdparty' doctrine [states] that a person's privacy interest is diminished where he or she reveals information
to a third party, even in confidence.").

88.
Tex. Sept.
89.
90.

United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, slip op. at *3 (W.D.
9, 2016).
Id.
Id. at *2.
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instead signaled his computer "to send certain [identifying] information." 9 1
A NIT does not need to attach itself onto the actual computer to cause the
computer to send information. And, as several courts concur, an IP address
is not a component of a computer: "When a consumer purchases a
computer, takes it home, opens it up, and turns it on, that computer does
not have an IP address." 9 An IP address is assigned to a computer by an
Internet service provider.9 3 This suggests that a user's IP address can
change entirely, depending on the Internet service provider.9 4
Therefore, the NIT in Torres could not have gathered content information
from Torres's computer "without permission" if what was gathered was not
a part of the computer to begin with. And when certain information is
conveyed to a third party, as when an IP address is conveyed to an Internet
service provider, the third-party doctrine renders the information "noncontent," precluding Fourth Amendment protection.9 5 This means that an
IP address is non-content information for two reasons: (1) it is conveyed to
a third party; 9' and (2) it is not part of a computer. 9 7
91. Id. (emphasis added) (explaining how the FBI deployed a NIT, which caused website users
to transmit information to a computer controlled by the FBI); see also United States v. Matish, 193 F.

Supp. 3d 585, 617 (E.D. Va. 2016) (describing how the "[d]efendant's IP address was revealed in transit
when the NIT instructed his computer to send [out] information to the FBI").

92. See United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No.: SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, slip op.
at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016); see also Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 617 ("As the Court understands it,
Defendant's IP address was not located on his computer; indeed, it appears that computers can have
various IP addresses depending on the networks to which they connect.").
93. See, e.g., Acevedo-Lemus, slip op. at *5 (recognizing an IP address as assigned by an ISP when
a computer attempts to connect to a given network).
94. See Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 617 (refuting the contention that an IP address is unique to
the individual computer; rather, "computers can have various IP addresses depending on the networks
to which they connect"); f Acevedo-Lemus, slip op. at *5 ("First, it does not matter that the government
procured Defendant's IP address from his computer as opposed to getting it from a third party because
an IP address is not a private physical feature of a computer, but a commonly disclosed digital one
assigned by a third party.").

95.

See, e.g., United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at *4 (4th Cir. Aug. 3,

2000) ("Disclosure of [] non-content information to a third party destroys the privacy expectation that
might have existed previously.").

96.

See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-4 (1979) ("This Court consistently has held that

a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.");Hambrick, 2000 WL 1062039, at *4 (clarifying that any expectation of privacy in non-content
information is destroyed upon conveyance to a third-party ISP); Acevedo-Lemus, slip op. at *5
(recognizing there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address because it "is not a
private physical feature of a computer, but a commonly disclosed digital one").
97. See Acevedo-Lemus, slip op. at *5 (emphasizing a "computer does not have an IP address" at
the time a consumer purchases, receives, and opens the computer); see also Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d
at 617 (promoting the trend of decisions supporting the conclusion that an IP address is not a unique
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To follow the court's cellphone analogy, visiting a website would be akin
to dialing a phone number." This similarity is important, considering the
Fourth Amendment does not protect specific numbers a user dials.9
Numbers dialed do not enjoy protection because cellphone users voluntarily
convey their phone numbers to telephone companies. 0 0 Consequently,
under the court's cellphone analogy, any expectation of privacy would be
void, because what is most similar between a cellphone and a computer, as
applied to Torres's case, is their comparable and consistently disclosed noncontent information.
C.

Dodging the Third-ParyDoctrine

One must wonder if the Torres court puposey dodged the TOR Fourth
Amendment issue. To understand this inquiry, one should question why
the court would avoid addressing the issue through the usual third-party
doctrine analysis mentioned before. The expectation of privacy in a user's
IP address is a frequent issue, and there was plenty of precedent with which
the court could work. 0 1

feature of a computer, but one assigned by ISPs).
98. The idea is: specific numbers dialed resemble specific URLs typed into a browser.
Analogously, just as an IP address identifies a user, in that the user may be located through an IP
address, a user can also be located or contacted through his personal cellphone number. See, e.g., United

States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding a similarity between IP addresses and
numbers dialed). But, as discussed, numbers dialed are precluded from Fourth Amendment protection.
See Smith, 442 U.S. at 735 (failing the test under Kat.Z because "it is doubtful that telephone users in
general have any expectation of privacy [in] the numbers they dial"). Therefore, the argument is that
because a specific number dialed is not protected, specific URLs are not protected. And because
specific URLs are not protected, via the third-party doctrine, a person's IP is likewise not protected.
99. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 735 (holding phone numbers dialed fails the Katt test for a reasonable
expectation of privacy because under voluntary-conveyance theory individuals cannot reasonably
expect such numbers to remain private).
100. See id. ("When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information
to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of
business.").

101.

See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,443 (1976) (adhering to clear Court precedent that

information loses any reasonable expectation of privacy once voluntarily conveyed to a third party

(citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971))); see also United States v. Christie, 624 F. 3d
558, 573 (3d Cir. 2010) (recognizing many federal courts agree that 'subscriber information provided
to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment's privacy expectation' because it is
voluntarily conveyed to third parties" (quoting United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196,1204 (10th Cir.

2008))); United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the defendant's
expectation of privacy because all information was voluntarily conveyed and the defendant "'assumed
the risk that [those] companies] would reveal [that information] to police"' (quoting Smith, 442 U.S.
at 744)); Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510 (applying a similar analysis as used in Smith, comparing numbers
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In the court's defense, Tores is a unique case-Torres was utilizing TOR
to conceal his IP address.1 0 2 There is not a single circuit court opinion
addressing a user's reasonable expectation of privacy in their IP address
while using TOR. This lack of guidance may have prompted the court to
avoid the third-party doctrine and instead attempt to resolve the matter
using a broader "content" analysis. That way, the court avoids addressing
an unprecedented issue and potential reversal on appeal.
Here, we must think outside the box: the court refusing to rule in light of
volumes of relevant precedent 0 3 might suggest the TOR issue is so atypical
it cannot be resolved with the current third-party doctrine. Otherwise,'the
court would have used it. Avoiding the third-party doctrine might have
been a silent call for adjustment in the law.

VI.

THE

THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE IN A DIGITAL AGE

As we have seen, the Fourth Amendment issue is typically addressed
under the third-party doctrine."o0
The doctrine holds that a reasonable

dialed to internet information provided to ISPs (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742)); Pemine, 518 F.3d at 1204
(approving the majority of federal courts that have addressed the issue of voluntary conveyance in
conjunction with subscriber information provided to ISPs); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cit.
2001) (declaring computer users hold no reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information
under the voluntary-conveyance theory).

102.

See United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-282-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, slip op. at *1 (W.D.

Tex. Sept. 9, 2016) (clarifying TOR's use in this case was to cause the website's IP log to record an IP
address other than the user's actual IP address, thereby concealing the user's identity).
103. See Milkr, 425 U.S. at 443 ("This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed." (citing White,

401 U.S. at 752)); see also White, 401 U.S. at 751-52 (1971) (analyzing the issue of whether any
expectation can be reasonable when an individual voluntarily conveys information to a third party,
noting that such disclosure assumes the risk that such information might be provided to police); Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (concluding the voluntary-conveyance theory destroys any
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, even when the trust in the third-party
is misplaced or obtained by deception); Christie, 624 F.3d at 573 (using third-party doctrine to rule that
subscriber information is not protected under the Fourth Amendment); Bynum, 604 F.3d at 164
(rejecting an expectation of privacy argument where all information was voluntarily conveyed to a third
party); Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510 (accepting other courts' conclusions and applying the voluntaryconveyance theory to hold no expectation of privacy exists); Perrine, 518 F.3d at 1204 (examining the
access of subscriber information under third-party doctrine and concluding that such information is
devoid of Fourth Amendment protection); Guest, 255 F.3d at 336 (utilizing the voluntary-conveyance
theory to conclude that such information is precluded from Fourth Amendment protection).

104. See, e.g., United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 442 (9th Cit. 2016) (applying the thirdparty doctrine to a defendant alleging a reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic communications).
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expectation of privacy is diminished when the subject information is
conveyed to a third party."os However, in a digital age, technological
advancements raise questions about the stability of this law. For instance,
TOR has received special attention under the Fourth Amendment,"o'
particularly because of the series of complicated steps required to use the
software." 0o
Some believe TOR warrants a "twist" in the third-party
doctrine. 0 8 Others oppose treating an expectation of privacy any different
because of TOR.1 0 9

105. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (denying the petitioner's argument because there can be no
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to a third party); see also United States v.

Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) ("Under the third-party doctrine, an individual can claim
'no legitimate expectation of privacy' in information that he has voluntarily turned over to a third

party." (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44)); United States v. Turner, 839 F.3d 429, 436 (5th Cit. 2016)
(adopting the reasoning of other courts using the third-party doctrine and applying it in the context of
a gift card); Mohamud, 843 F.3d at 442 (expressing the clear precedent that voluntary conveyance of
information destroys any expectation of privacy that may have existed prior to disclosure); United

States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1304-05 (10th Cit. 2016) ("The [Supreme] Court has, after all,
suggested that individuals lack any reasonable expectation of privacy and so forfeit any Fourth
Amendment protections in materials they choose to share with third parties like banks or telephone

companies."); Am. Civil Lberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 823 (2d Cir. 2015) (relying on the
voluntary-conveyance theory to find no reasonable expectation of privacy in public movements
because they are conveyed to the public (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983)));

United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th Cir. 2015) (deciding there is a decreased expectation of
privacy in information owned by a third party).
106. See Tim Cushing, Courts, DOJ. Using Tor Doesn'tGive You a GreaterExpectationofPrivacy, TECH

DIRT (Feb. 29, 2016,10:41 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20160228/15011333749/courts[https://perma.cc/N9ZX-D9PY]
doj-using-tor-doesnt-give-you-greater-expectation-privacy.shtm
(expressing concern in the recent decisions of federal courts which concluded IP addresses are exempt
from Fourth Amendment protection without using the third-party doctrine).

107.

See United States v. Broy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1049 (C.D. Ill. 2016) ("In order to use the

Tor network, a user must download and run Tor software on his or her personal computer. When
first logging into the Tor network, a user, whether knowingly or not, communicates his or her IP
address to the first node volunteer. It is only after an IP address has been routed through multiple
nodes that a user's IP address becomes masked. . . . [W]hen a user finally accesses a website while
logged into the Tor network, only the IP address of the 'exit node' is visible to that site[.]").
108. See Cushing, supra note 106 ("In this month alone, we've had two federal judges and the
DOJ state that there's no expectation of privacy in IP addresses. This would normally be something
covered by the Third Party Doctrine-where an IP address is part of the records retained by ISPs, and,
therefore, can be accessed with subpoenas rather than warrants. The twist, though, is that all of these
statements were made in reference to people who made an active effort to obscure their IP addresses
by using Tor.'.

109.

See United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, slip op. at *3 (W.D.

Tex. Sept. 9, 2016) (holding government use of NIT is a search).
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The Onion Router- Enough to Alter the Third-PartyDoctrine?

A district court in California held that TOR's requirements, despite their
complication, do not alter a Fourth Amendment analysis because a TOR
user still discloses an IP address to someone, somewhere."o The idea is
that any conveyance, without regard to whom or under what circumstances
the information is conveyed, is sufficient to nullify any expectation of
privacy."' At its core, the argument is: conveying information to a third
party ruins any expectation of privacy in that information, and using TOR
does not change that. As a result, the question becomes: when a person
uses TOR, does the software create a reasonable expectation of privacy where
there was none before? To analyze this, it is helpful to examine similar
doctrines.
The plain-view doctrine maintains that items in plain view do not enjoy a
reasonable expectation of privacy.112 The doctrine has been consistently
applied by courts at all levels."' In particular, the doctrine applies to any
items inside of a vehicle."' The Supreme Court has recognized that an

110. See United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No.: SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, slip
op. at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016) (rejecting the proposition that TOR alters a typical Fourth
Amendment analysis). The court explains:
It also does not matter that Defendant tried to shield his IP address from the government, since
he nonetheless disclosed that information to the initial Tor "entry node." As the Werdene court
explained, "a necessary aspect of Tor is the initial transmission of a user's IP address to a thirdparty"-the operator of the initial Tor node-and the fact that a user's IP address is
"subsequently bounced from node to node within the Tor network to mask his identity does not
alter the analysis of whether he had an actual expectation of privacy in that IP address[.]"
Id. (quoting United states v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2016)).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 442 (concluding that one's expectation
of privacy diminishes when conveying information to a third party).
112. See United States v. Hunley, No. 07-CR-168A, 2010 WL 2510901, at *9 (W.D.N.Y.
Feb. 26, 2010) ("[A] police officer's looking through the windows into the vehicle from outside, even
when shining a flashlight to illuminate the inside of the vehicle, does not constitute a 'search' of the
vehicle within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." (quoting Mollica v. Voker, 299 F.3d 366, 369
(2d Cir. 2000))).
113. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 118 (1986) (indicating places inside an automobile,
situated in plain view of persons outside the vehicle, are not "subject to a reasonable expectation of
privacy"); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (citations omitted) ("There is no legitimate
expectation of privacy shielding that portion of the interior of an automobile which may be viewed
from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers."); United States v.
Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421, 427 (2d Cit. 1981) (finding an item to be "in plain view" even though a police
officer used a flashlight to illuminate the inside of a lawfully stopped car).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Grajeda, 497 F.3d 879, 882 (8th Cit. 2007) ("While we are
assuming a Fourth Amendment violation for purposes of this analysis, it is significant that we have
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officer can look through the windshield of an automobile and note items in
plain view without Fourth Amendment barriers." 1 ' The idea seems to be
that once an item is openly visible to a third party, any expectation of privacy
is void. However, the question is whether a person can change something
about an item in plain view to create an expectation of privacy that did not
previously exist. Typically, for the plain-view doctrine, a person taking
affirmative steps to conceal an item in plain view has failed to alter plainview doctrine analysis. This might suggest the same reasoning applies to the
third-party doctrine. The following two cases describe this scenario.
B.

New York v. Class

In New York v. Class,"' two police officers "observed [the]
driving above the speed limit in a car with a cracked
respondent ...
One of the officers opened the door to the respondent's
windshield.""
vehicle in an attempt to locate the VIN, which was covered by papers." 8
The officer reached into the interior of respondent's car and moved the
papers from the dashboard, where the VIN was located."' The Supreme
Court rejected the proposition that a Fourth Amendment analysis is altered
when a user takes affirmative steps to conceal their VIN number, explaining
that "efforts to restrict access to an area do not generate a reasonable
expectation of privacy where none would otherwise exist." 1 2 0

never held that it is illegal for an officer to cross-check a VIN in both locations on a vehicle, and the
Supreme Court has held that the VIN location on either the dashboard or the doorjamb is not 'subject
to a reasonable expectation of privacy."' (quoting Class, 475 U.S. at 118)).

115.

See Class, 475 U.S. at 120 (Powell,

J.,

concurring) ("[A]n officer making a lawful stop of a

vehicle has the right and duty to inspect the VIN.").

116.
117.
118.
119.

New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
Id. at 107-08.
Id. at 106.
Id.

120.

See id. at 114 (stressing that even where a VIN has been purposely concealed, such actions

fail to create a sphere of privacy (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-84 (1984))). The
Court reasoned:
We think it makes no difference that the papers in respondent's car obscured the VIN from the
plain view of the officer. We have recently emphasized that efforts to restrict access to an area
do not generate a reasonable expectation of privacy where none would otherwise exist. Here,
where the object at issue is an identification number behind the transparent windshield of an
automobile driven upon the public roads, we believe that the placement of the obscuring papers
was insufficient to create a privacy interest in the VIN.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Oliver v. United States

A second example is Oliver v. United States.12 1 There, two narcotic agents
received a tip "that marihuana was being [grown] on the farm of [the]
When they arrived at the farm, the gate to the
petitioner. ...
petitioner's home was locked and had a "No Trespassing" sign. 1 23 During
their initial walk-through, the agents passed a parked camper from which
someone shouted "[n]o hunting is allowed, come back up here[;]" but the
officers continued their investigation and found a field of marijuana.1 2 4
Applying Justice Harlan's two-pronged test, "the District Court
suppressed evidence of the discovery of the marihuana field." 12 5 The
district court noted the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the field because he "had done all that could be expected of him to assert
Of specific
his privacy in the area of the farm that was searched." 1 2
importance was the petitioner's posted signs, which read "No Trespassing"
at intervals throughout the property, a locked gate at the entrance, and
"woods, fences, and embankments" bounding the property from all
sides. 1 27 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court rejected the district court's
approach, reasoning "[t]he test of legitimacy is not whether the individual
chooses to conceal assertedly 'private' activity. . . . [but] whether the
government's intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values
protected by the Fourth Amendment." 128
D.

United States v. Werdene
We now return to the third-party doctrine to examine whether a person

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 182-83. The Court held:

Initially, we reject the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy establish that expectations of
privacy in an open field are legitimate. It is true, of course, that petitioner Oliver and respondent
Thornton, in order to conceal their criminal activities, planted the marihuana upon secluded land
and erected fences and "No Trespassing" signs around the property.... Neither of these
suppositions demonstrates, however, that the expectation of privacy was legitimate in the sense
required by the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 182.
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can create a reasonable expectation of privacy. In United States v. Werdene,1 2 9
a criminal suspect was browsing online with TOR and encountered a
NIT.1 3 o The FBI-deployed NIT was similar to the NIT used in Torres, in
that it "caused software to be activated" when a user logged into a specific
website, thereby causing the "user's computer to reveal its IP address to the
FBI.""' The court refused to alter the Fourth Amendment analysis, but
also took its holding one step further. Relying on Smith v. Mayland,1 3 2 the
court reasoned that the "type of third-party" one discloses information to
"does not affect the Court's evaluation of his reasonable expectation of
privacy." 1 3 3
Playing devil's advocate, a critic might argue the court relied on a faulty
premise. In Smith, the Supreme Court did not hold that the "type of thirdparty" one discloses information to is of no importance. Instead, the Court
analyzed a very narrow issue-whether a company, having facilities to
record information disclosed by a third party, altered the analysis by electing
to employ one program over another.' 3
The argument made by the
Petitioner was based on how a company chose to record information, not

129.

United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431 (E.D. Pa. 2016).

130. Id. at 435. It should be noted that the Werdene court did not avoid addressing the user's IP
address under the third-party doctrine as the court did in Torres. See United States v. Torres, No. 5:16-

CR-285-DAE, 2016 WL 4821223, slip op. at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016) (addressing the content in
Torres's computer, rather than his IP address, reasoning Torres's "expectation of privacy in his IP
address [was] of no import"). Here, the court addressed the issue with the third-party doctrine head
on. See Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 444 (E.D. Pa. 2016) ("Werdene had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his IP address. Aside from providing the address to Comcast, his internet service provider,
a necessary aspect of Tor is the initial transmission of a user's IP address to a third-party. . . .").
131. See Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 435 (noting the FBI's use of the NIT was to circumvent

TOR).
132.
133.

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 444-45. The court explained:

In Smith, the petitioner argued that the numbers he dialed on his telephone remained private
because they were processed through automatic switching equipment rather than a live
operator.... Similarly, the type ofthird-party to which Werdene disclosed his IP address-whether

a person or an "entry node" on the Tor network-does not affect the Court's evaluation of his
reasonable expectation of privacy. He was aware that his IP address had been conveyed to a third
party and he accordingly lost any subjective expectation of privacy in that information.
Id. (emphasis added) (first citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 745; then citing United States v. Farrell, No. CR15029RAJ, 2016 WL 705197, slip op. at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2016)).
134. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745 (emphasis added) ("The fortuity of whether or not the phone
company in fact elects to make a quasi-permanent record of a particular number dialed does not in our
view, make any constitutional difference.").
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the type of third party to whom the information was disclosed."'s "Under
petitioner's theory, Fourth Amendment protection would exist, or not,
depending on how the telephone company chose to define local-dialing
zones, and depending on how it chose to bill its customers for local calls.""'
In contrast, when using TOR, the issue is not how the Internet service
provider records information, because TOR's mission is to ensure the
Internet service provider records misleading information.' The Werdene
court's conclusion might be open to criticism.
VII.

THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE IS ILL-SUITED FOR A DIGITAL AGE

Class, Oliver, and Werdene are important for two reasons. First, they
suggest a privacy interest cannot be created by affirmative actions or certain
software. Thus, as applied to a TOR user, whether a person takes
affirmative steps to browse anonymously, seemingly plays no role in modern
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. On the other hand, these three cases
demonstrate how novel TOR is. Class dealt with an individualattempting to
cover his VIN number; Oliver dealt with an individualgrowing illegal drugs
on his farm. TOR requires thousands of users to join together for the sole
purpose of remaining anonymous. Additionally, one should recognize that
the Werdene court likely examined Smith, and tried to mold its reasoning to a
modern issue, namely TOR browsing. This is because the third-party
doctrine has not been directly applied to digital issues by the Court. But the
issue must be addressed. Software (like TOR) is unique-it requires a network
of users 1 3 8 working simultaneously to bypass the complex web of multi-

.

135. See id. (emphasis added) ("Regardless of the phone company's eletion [of one method over
another], petitioner voluntarily conveyed to it information that it had facilities for recording and that it
was free to record.").
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. See Jill Scharr, What is Tor? Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, TOM'S GUIDE
(Oct. 23, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.tomsguide.com/us/what-is-tor-faq,news-17754.html
[https://perma.cc/72CJ-VSUQ] ("[The Onion Router] is an Internet networking protocol designed to
anonymize the data relayed across it. Using Tor's software will make it difficult, if not impossible, for
any snoops to see your webmail, search history, social media posts or other online activity."); see also
Glance, supra note 15 ("Tor provides secrecy and anonymity by passing messages through a network
of connected Tor relays, which are specially configured computers. As the message hops from one
node to another, it is encrypted in a way that each relay only knows about the machine that sent the
message. .
138. See Scharr, supra note 137 ("The Tor network runs through the computer servers of
thousands of volunteers (over 4,500 at time of publishing) spread throughout the world. Your data is
bundled into an encrypted packet when it enters the Tor network."); see also United States v. Broy,
209 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1048-49 (C.D. Ill. 2016) ("[The 'Tor' network [is] an open-source software tool
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dimensional networks known as the Internet.' This feat requires a global
effort and is distinct from the typical disclosure of information.1 4 0
Indeed, NITs and TOR are not the only technological advancements
presenting privacy concerns within the third-party doctrine. In United States
v. De LIsle,14 1 the Eighth Circuit addressed the reasonable expectation of
privacy in a user's credit card information under the third-party doctrine. 14 2
Under a rigid application of the third-party doctrine, consumers lose all
reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank account when they swipe to
make a purchase.1 4 1 Cellphone location tracking has also prompted privacy
concerns.'
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit expressed a deep concern
over third-party doctrine enabling the government to intrude on vast
amounts of personal information, even when users take several steps to
conceal that information:
[T]he majority's blunt application of the third-party doctrine threatens to

.

allow the government access to a staggering amount of information that surely
must be protected under the Fourth Amendment. Consider the information
that Google gets from users of its e-mail and online search functions. . .

which routes communications through multiple computers called 'nodes' in order to mask a user's IP
address and, thus, keeps the user's identity anonymous.").
139. See Scharr, supra note 137 (explaining how a data packet passing through the TOR network
is not fully traceable).
140. See id. ("[Unlike the case with normal Internet connections, Tor strips away part of the
packet's header, which is a part of the addressing information that could be used to learn things about
the sender such as the operating system from which the message was sent.").
141. United States v. De L'Isle, 825 F.3d 426 (8th Cir. 2016).
142. See id. at 432 ("When the holder uses the card[l he 'knowingly disclose[s] the information
on the magnetic strip of his credit card to a third party and cannot claim a reasonable expectation of
privacy in it."' (quoting United States v. Medina, No. 09-20717-CR, 2009 WL 3669636, at *11 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 24, 2009))).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (maintaining the idea
that voluntary conveyance of information to a third party diminishes one's expectation of privacy in
the information).
144. See Recent Case, FourthAmendment- WarrantlessSearches- New Jersey Supreme Court Holds that
State Constitution Requires Police to Obtain WarrantBefore Accessing Cell-Site Location Information. - State v.
Earls, 70 A3d 630 (N.J. 2013), 127 HARV. L. REv. 2164, 2164 (2014) (foomotes omitted) ("Lower
federal courts and state courts, the early battlegrounds on which privacy disputes are waged, are often
hesitant to distinguish Supreme Court precedent, even when changes in the technological landscape
are dramatic. A conflict of this nature has been brewing in the courts over whether law enforcement
must obtain a warrant before accessing individuals' cell-site location information (CSLI) from cell
phone service providers."); see generally Shannon Jaeckel, Comment, Cell Phone Location Tracking:
Reforming the Standard to Rylect Modern Privacy Expectations, 77 LA. L. REv. 143 (2016) (discussing
Louisiana's laws regarding cell site location information and competing privacy interests).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

25

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 49 [2018], No. 1, Art. 3

262

ST. MARY'S LAfWJOURNAL

[Vol. 49:237

Google collects information about you (name, e-mail address, telephone
number, and credit card data); the things you do online (what videos you
watch, what websites you access, and how you view and interact with
advertisements); the devices you use (which particular phone or computer you
are searching on); and your actual location.... Under a plain reading of the
majority's rule ... we give up any privacy interest in that information. 1 4 5
Thus, there is strong support for the proposition that the third-party
doctrine, in its current form, is insufficient for addressing TOR or other
digital issues, which will undoubtedly arise as society continues to advance.
In United States v. Jones,1 4 6
This is not a novel proposition.
Justice Sotomayor warned the third-party doctrine may require change as
society modernizes:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which
people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in
the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People disclose the phone numbers
that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and
the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to online
retailers.... I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the
warrantless disclosure to the Government of a list of every Web site they had
visited in the last week, or month, or year. 1 4 7

145. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 535-36 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin,
(footnotes omitted). The court continued:

J.,

dissenting)

And why stop there? Nearly every website collects information about what we do when we visit.
So now, under the majority's rule, the Fourth Amendment allows the government to know from
YouTube.com what we watch, or Facebook.com what we post or whom we "friend," or
Amazon.com what we buy, or Wikipedia.com what we research, or Match.com whom we dateall without a warrant. In fact, the government could ask "cloud"-based file-sharing services like
Dropbox or Apple's iCloud for all the files we relinquish to their servers. I am convinced that
most internet users would be shocked by this. But as far as I can tell, every argument the
government makes in its brief regarding cell site location data applies equally well to e-mail
accounts, search-engine histories, shopping-site purchases, [and] cloud-storage files ....
Id. at 536; see also Mohamud, 843 F.3d at 442 (explaining that conveyance of information to a third party
diminishes a privacy interest, even if disseminated in confidence).
146. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
147. Id. at 417-18 (Sotomayor,J., concurring).
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Courts at all levels, from all parts of the country, have recognized the
possible futility of the third-party doctrine in a digital age."' And until the

148. See United States v. Wheelock, 772 F.3d 825,829 (8th Cir. 2014) (recognizing "the Supreme
Court may revise its view on third-party disclosures in the digital context, but until then, we are bound
by precedent, and the actual majority opinion in Jones did not address the third-party disclosure
doctrine, let alone purport to desert or limit it"); see also In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d
600, 623 (5th Cir. 2013) (Dennis, J., dissenting) ("Justice Sotomayor cast the critical fifth vote in
support of the majority opinion. However, her concurrence expressed serious doubt about extending
the third party records doctrine applied in [Smith] and relied upon by today's majority ... ."); Apodaca
v. N.M. Adult Prob. and Parole, 998 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1180 (D.N.M. 2014) (stating "it may no longer
be sound to universally hold to the third-party disclosure rule to determine whether a subjective
expectation of privacy exists"); New York v. Thompson, 28 N.Y.S.3d 237, 250 (N.Y. 2016) ("The
[third-party] doctrine has also been subject to significant criticism[.]"). The Thompson court goes on to
quote justice Sotomayor, adopting her reasoning that it may be necessary to reconsider the premise
underlying the third-party doctrine, because it is "ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a
great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks." Id. at 251 (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). Further, the court
explains how in a modern society, it is common for people to "relay sensitive personal information by
email," and that it would be archaic to preclude Fourth Amendment protection because of the thirdparty doctrine. See id. ("[T]he assertion that no Fourth Amendment protections apply to such
communications because email requires an email account, in this Court's view, is an archaic notion
which negates the protection of the Fourth Amendment for many of our most private
communications."); see also Commonwealth v. Augustine, 4 N.E.3d 846, 863 n.35 (Mass. 2014)
("Although, as stated in the text, we do not reject the third-party doctrine as a general matter, the rapid
expansion in the quantity of third-party data generated through new technologies raises important
questions about the continued viability of the third-party doctrine in the digital age."); Tracey v. Florida,
152 So. 3d 504, 519 (Fla. 2014) (agreeing "it might be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third
Of importance is
parties" (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring))).
Justice Sotomayor's belief that the third-party doctrine is not apt in a digital age, where people are
comfortable revealing personal information about themselves on a daily basis, and through the course
of routine tasks. See id. at 519-20 (citingJones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)) (describing
Justice Sotomayor's thoughts on the way people share information); see also Wisconsin v. Tate,
849 N.W.2d 798, 828 (Wis. 2014) (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) ("Justice Sotomayor got it right in her
concurrence in [Jones], which casts doubt on the continued viability of a broad third-party doctrine in
the digital age[.]" (citingJones,565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor,J., concurring))); Ford v. Texas, 444 S.W.3d
171, 202 (Tex. App-San Antonio 2014, pet. granted) (Chapa,J., dissenting) ("But the Supreme Court
has recently recognized that modern cell phones-now a 'pervasive and insistent' part of modern lifepresent privacy concerns far beyond the founding principles of the Fourth Amendment and the
circumstances of the founding era." (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014))). The
Ford court reasoned that just as cellphones altered Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, modern society
has advanced to the point that mundane tasks involve conveying information to third parties, and so
the law should again adjust. See id. at 202 ("Similar to the way that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine
was ill suited to the digital data contained on cell phones seized during an arrest, the third-party doctrine
is 'ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks."' (quotingJones,565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring))).
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Supreme Court re-examines the issue, 1 4 9 courts across the country will
continue to produce differing opinions.
From a logical approach, the third-party doctrine is surely outdated. It is
difficult to imagine that an expectation of privacy is rendered void if the
information is conveyed to the Central Intelligence Agency through
sophisticated and confidential communication channels.
On a less
sophisticated scale, it is also rejected that an expectation of privacy is void
merely because the information was communicated to an attorney to gain
legal advice, or to a doctor to obtain treatment.
If placing a "No
Trespassing" sign is not enough to obtain a reasonable expectation of
privacy,1 so then more than a mere conveyance should be required to nullify
a similar expectation of privacy.
A.

A Proposal

This Comment urges for Supreme Court guidance on the third-party
doctrine in the digital age. Specifically, the Court must create a framework
which considers the nature of a conveyance to a third-party and requires a
detailed examination of the ircumstances surrounding a disclosure. To
illustrate the importance, consider whether society should prevent innocent
people from using TOR, or whether the focus should only be on criminals.
Remaining anonymous is not necessarily criminal.
Some users have
legitimate legal reasons to utilize TOR."' The Eleventh Circuit recognized

149.

See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 437-38

(4th Cir. 2016) (en banc)

(acknowledging the need for the Supreme Court to revisit the third-party doctrine).
Graham articulated:

The court in

Ultimately, of course, the Supreme Court may decide to revisit the third-party doctrine.
Justice Sotomayor has suggested that the doctrine is "ill suited to the digital age, in which people
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks.".. But Justice Sotomayor also made clear that tailoring the Fourth Amendment
to "the digital age" would require the Supreme Court itself to "reconsider" the third-party
doctrine.
... [Ulnless and until the Supreme Court so holds, we are bound by the contours of the thirdparty doctrine as articulated by the Court.
Id. at 437 (quotingjones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).

150.

See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 170 (1984) (rejecting the proposition that a "No

Trespassing" sign altered Fourth Amendment analysis).
151. See
Criminal
Atfiti_*
and
Your
IP
Address,
ASSOcIATE'S
MIND,
http://associatesmind.com/2011/08/26/criminal-activity-and-your-ip-address
[https://perma.cc/
K8RT-QJL7] (enumerating potentially innocent people, such as libertarians or social activists, that may
seek to obscure their identity for legitimate reasons when they go online).
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the negative consequences of stripping innocent users of their privacy
through the third-party doctrine merely because they participated in
mundane activities. 15 2
But the dynamics change when TOR is used to conduct criminal
activity.'s5 Criminal activity should be weighed through a balancing test,
utilized by a court. This would not be a departure from current law. For
instance, the Third Circuit has held a defendant's expectation of privacy is
not one society is ready to accept when it is an "unauthorized"
transmission.1 5 4 Likewise, the Third Circuit reasoned that an unauthorized
driver of a rented vehicle lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
vehicle because he is deceiving the true owner."5 5 The Supreme Court has

152.

See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 535 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin,

J.,

dissenting)

(arguing against a "blunt application of the third-party doctrine [because it] threatens . . a staggering
amount of private information'.
153. See Peeling the Onion-Tor's Criminal Content Reveakd, INFOSECURITY MAG. (Mar. 2, 2014),
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/peeling-the-onion-tors-criminal-content-revealed
[https://perma.cc/Y2AV-5B72] ("The Tor Network has long been known for hosting a large number
of resources carrying out illegal activity."); see also Cara McGoogan, Dark web browser Tor is
overwhelmingly
used for crme,
says
study, THE TELEGRAPH
(Feb. 2, 2016,
2:35PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/02/02/dark-web-browser-tor-is-overwheliniglyused-for-crime-says-study [https://perma.cc/8Y2Z-JU9P] ("In the first study of its kind, researchers
at King's College London found that 57 per cent of the sites designed for Tor-known as onion
sites-facilitate criminal activity, including drugs, illicit finance, and extreme pornography."); Sara
Peters,

Darknet is

READING

(Sept. 15,

Full of

2015,

Criminals &

8:00

PM),

Governments Giving

TOR

a

Bad Name,

DARK

http://www.darkreading.com/analytics/darknet-is-full-

of-criminals-and-governrnents-giving-tor-a-bad-name/d/d-id/1322211
[https://perma.cc/VR9WMU9S] ("[TOR contains] a wide assortment of criminal marketplaces - for human trafficking, child
pornography, and murder."); CiminalActivity and Your IP Address, supra note 151 ("Of course, using
TOR is also useful if you are attempting to disguise online criminal activity. By routing traffic through
a TOR relay, a criminal can 'hide their tracks' to some extent. If law enforcement associates an IP
address with the criminal activity on a TOR network ... they have not found the criminal, but merely
the last used TOR exit relay."). But see Jack Smith IV, Stop Calng Tor The Web Browser For Criminals',

OBSERVER (Sept. 16, 2014, 10:33 AM), http://observer.com/2014/09/stop-calling-tor-the-webbrowser-for-criminals/ [https://perma.cc/E9V4-CKXP] ("[B]eyond the scary-sounding dark net,
there are dozens of use-cases for Tor that have nothing to do with cybercrime."). On balance, however,
it is unlikely these "dozens" of legitimate uses outweigh the need to unveil the identity of criminals.
See Bill Bosen, Dark
Web--Tor Use is 50%
Criminal Activity-How to Detect It,
FORTSCALE (May 25, 2016), https://insider.fortscale.com/dark-web-tor-use-is-50-criminal-activity-

how-to-detect-it/ [https://perma.cc/P6W2-NZNY\] ("[A]lthough not all Tor usage is cybercriminals,
a huge percentage of it is.").

154. See United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2014) (rejecting a reasonable
expectation of privacy in unauthorized transmissions of child pornography).

155.

See United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding an unauthorized

driver of a rental car has no reasonable expectation of privacy because he "acts in contravention of the
owner's property rights, [and] also deceives the owner of the vehicle").
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also chimed in, explaining that even though a burglar robbing a cabin "may
have a . . . justified subjective expectation of privacy," society is not ready
to accept that expectation as reasonable because a burglar's presence is
"wrongful."'
Therefore, whether a person is committing a crime is
certainly a factor in ascertaining whether that person holds a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
But, consider this: in the digital age, it might be unreasonable to believe
your computer is immune from hacking."' Computer hacking has become
so common that software experts are providing the public with tips and
tricks for avoiding hackers. 1 5'
One expert produced a laundry list of
common hacking techniques, including a keylogger, denial of service,
waterhole attacks, fake WAPs, eavesdropping, phishing, viruses, trojans,
clickjacking attacks, cookie theft, and a bait and switch."' Therefore,
whether a person is engaged in activity that is prone to hacking could be
factored into the equation. The uncertainty, and the need for a balancing
inquiry, re-affirms the need to examine the nature of a third-party disclosure
when assessing a Fourth Amendment interest. However, without revisiting
the doctrine, district courts across the country are left holding valid, but
outdated law in one hand, and new technological problems in the other.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

On one hand, society wants the government to prevent criminals from
utilizing TOR. On the other hand, the need for truth and justice may not

156. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (quotingJones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 267 (1960)).
157. See, e.g., Lee Rainic, How Americans Balance Privacy Concerns with Sharing PersonalInformation:
5 Key Findings, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2016/01/14/key-findings-privacy-information-sharing/
[https://perma.cc/8EVM-YF2Y]
(reporting that members of a focus group "worried about hackers," though some accept privacy
tradeoffs as "part of modern life"); see also United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 619 (E.D. Va.
2016) ("Now, it seems unreasonable to think that a computer connected to the Web is immune from
invasion. Indeed, the opposite holds true: in today's digital world, it appears to be a virtual certainty
that computers accessing the internet can-and eventually will-be hacked.").
158. See, e.g., Shritam Bhowmick, 10 Most Popular Way Hackers Hack Your Website,
DEFENCELY (June l4, 2013), https://defencely.com/blog/10-popular-ways-hackers-hack-website/
[https://perma.cc/ZN6Y-3VVW] (enumerating the ten most popular ways hackers "can threaten the
security of your site, and your business" and providing warning signs).
159. See Amar Shekhar, Top 10 Common Hacking Techniques You Should Know About,
FOSSBYTES (June 4, 2016), https://fossbytes.com/hacking-techniques/ [https://perma.cc/9386LFSG] (providing a cursory exposition of common hacking techniques).
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outweigh society's need for privacy.' 60
Nevertheless, a thorough
examination of the circumstances should be required. A static approach to
the exclusionary rule is directly at odds to long standing interpretations of
the Constitution. 6 1 Justice Brandeis reasoned that the Constitution is
enacted "from an experience of evils," but the Fourth Amendment's
language should not be "confined to the form that the evil ha[s] theretofore
taken." 16 2 Constitutional interpretations are not static. It has long been
held that as technology advances the law must adjust.1 6 3 This continues to
hold true today.

160.

See United States v. Johnson, No. 15-00340-01-CR-W-GAF, 2016 WL 6136586, slip op.

at *7 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 20, 2016) (speaking to whether a user's "subjective desire to maintain his Internet
anonymity is one society is prepared to accept as reasonable" the court explains "society as a whole
does not believe that patrons and promoters of child pornography should be free to traipse around the
Internet like some invisible Peeping Tom"; however, "society might well accept that there are other
instances and situations where cyber-anonymity is both important and reasonable"). Indeed, there are
instances users utilize TOR for non-criminal activity. See CriminalAcivity and Your IP Address, supra
note 151 (giving examples of persons who may legitimately seek internet anonymity).

161.

See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

(indicating constitutional provisions affording protections to individuals "must have a . . . capacity of
adaptation to a changing world."), overruled inpart by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

162.
163.

Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 538 (11th Cit. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting)

(demonstrating "the extent of information" exposed "to third parties has increased" with magnitude
since the Supreme Court established the third-party doctrine). Specifically, the Davis court explains
that when the third-party doctrine was established, nearly forty years ago, it was long before cellphone
tracking or the Internet came into existence. Id. In light of "extraordinary technological advances,"
the dissenting judge felt the Supreme Court required lower courts to "critically evaluate how far to
extend the third-party doctrine." Id. The court also explained how a blanket application of the thirdparty doctrine would result in a slippery slope, framing the issue as a "perfect example of why the
Supreme Court has insisted that technological change sometimes requires us to consider the scope of
decades-old Fourth Amendment rules." Id. at 537 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35
(2001)); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 (rejecting a "mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment" in the
face of "advancing technology"); 9C Kat, 389 U.S. at 353 (recognizing prior Court decisions involving
the trespass doctrine and its physical intrusion component have become "so eroded" over time that
they "can no longer be regarded as controlling"). A familiar example is Rily v. Cakfornia, 134 S. Ct.
2473 (2014). There, the Court departed from decades-old law because of rapid technological
advancements. See Rily, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (finding a departure from old precedent necessary because
"phones are based on technology nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago").
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